In this chapter, I look at a case in which a myth about a specific region was transformed into an anthropological reality. While I take my cue from Adam Kuper’s *The Invention of Primitive Society* (Kuper 1988), my use of the term ‘culture’ is almost completely opposite to what he had in mind. I cannot imagine abolishing it, although I agree with Pina-Cabral (this volume) that it has been used uncritically. Words and concepts that we use should be taken in the context where they appear. Understanding Balkan societies, their self-representations, and the ways in which they want others to see and interpret them would be very difficult, if not impossible, without taking into account their perceptions of culture. In this region, as in other former communist-ruled countries, the term *culture* meant something very different from what it implied in Western industrialized societies (Wachtel 2003): it was and remains an important marker of ethnic and national self-awareness, of the degree of national development, and of distinction. It thus defines and determines ‘stories we want to tell others about ourselves’ in a very particular way. Conversely, and in almost equal measure, representations of the Balkans in mainstream Europe carried the implication that Balkan peoples had little or no culture.

Taking as read anthropological writings on the problematic character of representation in general (de C oppet 1992; M arcus and Fisher 1986; see also Pina C abral, this volume), I will concentrate here on the issues raised by the representation – and self-representation – of ‘the Balkans’. Speech marks are necessary here – though they will be omitted in the remainder of the chapter – since the term, concept and geographical area has been both invented and
contested in the fiercest of terms. Mention of the Balkans provokes strongly-felt and loudly-expressed opinions; representatives of the countries concerned periodically either fiercely oppose or eagerly assert their inclusion in this overarching unit. Such assertions of inclusion/exclusion have serious political, ideological and cultural implications (cf. Todorova 1994, 1997; Ristović 1995; K arakasidou 2002; Jezernik 2004).

This region became especially interesting for outside observers following the bloody dissolution of the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Throughout that decade, wars in the former Yugoslavia were predominant in media coverage and preoccupied public opinion throughout the world (Baskar 1999; M uršić 2000). The sheer amount of violence broadcast on television was shocking for audiences: atrocities unheard of since the end of the Second World War were being acted out dangerously close to home, and mass murders and rapes were being committed in Europe for the first time since 1945. How was this possible? And what kind of people were able to commit such horrible acts?

Explaining violent conflicts has never been easy for anthropologists. As enlightened professionals mostly based in non-conflict societies, we tend to see ourselves as somewhat superior to our subjects. The lack of enlightenment of these natives, in turn, is evident from the fact that they appear to be able only to solve their differences through violence. But this does not mean that anthropologists are unwilling to take sides: when conflict began in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, some anthropologists rushed to the aid of ‘their’ ethnic groups – the ones in which they had done fieldwork, or where they had friends and colleagues (see Simic 2000; D enitch 2000). Their adoption of this insider stance inevitably complicated readings and relationships. While the issues of who was fighting whom, where and why, and what was actually going on, seemed quite clear to outside observers, these new insiders felt the need to justify the stance of those they were supporting by using a variety of sometimes quite quirky and distinctly unscholarly explanations. Alongside the more usual legacy of the Second World War and of various earlier conflicts, these included ancient hatreds, self-defense, and a genetic predisposition toward killing and destruction. Some of these became manifest in debates at the American Anthropological Association (A A A ) meetings of 1992 and 1993, at which many anthropologists took sides, based on where they had done their fieldwork in the former Yugoslavia. The consequences of these debates and attempted explanations were worrying, since some authors’ explanations were then used as a means for extreme nationalists to justify ‘their cause’. In the case of Robert H ayden, involvement in the struggle was taken even further. A specialist in the anthropology of law, professor in the D epartment of Anthropology at the U niversity of Pittsburgh, and (at the time of writing) head of the A A A ’s section on Eastern Europe, he appeared as an expert witness at the trial of Dušan Tadić, one of those accused (and eventually convicted) of genocide at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in The Hague.
What anthropologists do, or believe in, therefore, is not always neutral or purely theoretical. Even – or especially – where they claim or attempt objectivity, this can result in rejoinders, angry rebuttals or threats of legal action. The aftermath of the publication of a paper by Cushman (2004) is a case in point. Cushman accused some anthropologists of siding with the Serbians and of supporting genocide in former Yugoslavia during the wars of the 1990s. While it is easy to understand his moral outrage, Cushman’s vehemence evoked heated responses (Denich 2005; Hayden 2005) and got the editor of the journal at the time into trouble. Such a case does not, of course, distinguish anthropologists from professionals in other academic fields or disciplines, but as my primary interest here is in explaining certain models of culture and behaviour, I will leave issues of morality to people with more interest in the ethics of academic work. The crucial point is at the same time the most obvious one: when writing about politically charged situations, anthropologists should try to stick to the facts; ‘reality,’ no matter how apparently elusive (see Pina-Cabral, this volume), is what anthropological writing should be about. Writing about actual (observed) ethnographic situations, and trying to make the points of view of the underrepresented clear, should also clarify the most important issues about the ethics of research.3

Models for Explanations

One possible way of explaining anthropologists’ partisan involvement with those they study, while simultaneously seeing them as ‘less evolved’, can be developed from Kuper’s account of the invention of primitive society (Kuper 1988). Many anthropologists needed different, distant, exotic others as the basis for their explanatory models – from the totemic system of Australian Aborigines, through Amazonian Indians who lived ‘close to nature’ (and hence were supposed to fully understand it), to the present.5 As the world became more globalised, and ‘natives’ increasingly participated in First World debates and discourses, it seemed natural that these distant and exotic others should be found in Europe. These ‘new primitives’ were to be located in the Balkan peninsula.

Some geographical reconceptualisations occurred in this relocation of the primitive. First of all, a new and different geography had to be invented. It was possible for the then British prime minister, Tony Blair, to declare in 1999 that the West would not tolerate crimes in Kosovo, ‘on the borders of Europe’. A similar representation was present in the abstracts of a recent anthropology conference (the 2006 European Association of Social Anthropologists conference in Bristol), where it was stated that Slovenia was ‘on the periphery of Europe.’ These statements, reflecting a European Union-centred view, show profound ignorance of the historical and political processes which have shaped the subcontinent over the last several hundred
The ‘West’ is a product of relatively recent history (Toulmin 1990), and the Western political and economic powers and the discourses which justify and legitimate them were acquired in the course of great colonial expansions by the nations of the north-western edge of the European peninsula (cf. Bauman 1993: 135–6) in the last three centuries.

Such remappings, then, refer to a symbolic geography in which the centre is Western Europe and everything beyond it is considered distant, marginal, exotic or even ‘non-European’ (see also Živković 2001). Such statements are not, however, held only by outsiders. In the case of Slovenia, there is also a sense of self-doubt about the extent to which Slovenian identity counts as fully European, despite the fact that the capital of Slovenia, Ljubljana, is physically much closer to most Western European capitals than, for example, Budapest in Hungary. An explanation can be sought in the oppositional character of the cold war. Although Slovenia was considered to be the most ‘pro-Western’ of all the states of the former Yugoslavia (1918–1991), its having been ruled by the Communist Party between 1945 and 1990 still made it distinctly ‘non-Western.’

This symbolic remapping involved considerable reinvention and re-explanation, as Maria Todorova’s book *Imagining the Balkans* (1997) makes clear. On the one hand, Todorova rightly points to the stereotypes traditionally present in Western descriptions and interpretations of the Balkans. She demonstrates how the myth of the Balkans was constructed from literary accounts, both those of nineteenth-century travellers and adventurers and those of the Balkan wars of 1912/1913. The wars in particular created a powerful image, and a stereotype, of the Balkans, one which was further reinforced when the post-First World War partition of the Austro-Hungarian Empire gave rise to the term ‘balkanization’. Of course, with the exception of Albania, all other countries of the Balkan peninsula had some sort of political existence even before the First World War, as Todorova points out (ibid.: 32ff). Hence, the procedure of ‘balkanization’ could easily be represented as a return to some pre-existing reality as it could be an unnatural and violent splintering of what properly ought to remain a single whole. Furthermore, the aftermath of the war actually saw more ‘new’ countries being created in Central Europe than it did in the Balkans. Nonetheless, the term ‘balkanization’ entered into political discourse after 1918, depicting unimaginable horrors of endless partition, and has been used to illuminate dangers in various parts of the world, from Haiti (by DuBois), through Lebanon – with the famous statement of one of its government officials in the 1980s: ‘We shall not allow the Balkanization of Lebanon!’ – to the former French colonies of West Africa – ‘There are all the makings of a “Balkan situation” in West Africa’ (quoted in ibid.: 35).

In similar vein, Jezernik’s *Wild Europe* (2004) demonstrates a long history of stereotyping in representations of the region, showing how the Balkans was equated with the oriental, primitive and uncivilized, and how it was shown to be devoid of any culture. The Balkans thus became an important
marker of what is permissible and what is not. All that was bad and alien to Western civilization was put into the imaginary realm of the Balkans, transferred into another place, another reality, where different principles of cognition and different modes of behavior were seen to be located. This mythical place was taken to represent the developing stages through which Western Europe – signifying the member countries of the European Union – had passed en route to a civilized status. As such, people from the Balkans were, and are, seen as being something like children: not quite on the same intellectual level as adults, and always in need of being told how to behave and what to do. These points reveal the evolutionist biases behind representations of the Balkans.

Unfortunately, in Todorova’s construction of the concept of balkanism, inspired by Edward Said’s Orientalism (1978), she fell unintentionally into the trap of simplification and essentialisation. Indeed, her book served as an important tool for those authors who were trying to put into context, justify or relativise Serb aggression in Croatia and Bosnia, as they claimed that this was all a problem of perception. According to representations like those by different Serb authors in the volume edited by Bjelić and Savić (2002), or by Bakić-Hayden (1995), the Serbs were presented as genuinely evil, when all they were trying to do was to fight for their homeland, freedom and basic human rights. In an unexpected twist, these essentialised representations allowed other authors (see the examples in Cushman 2004) and, later, Western politicians and the media, to orientalise and subsequently dehumanise the Serbs. They showed how such stereotypes were taken as justifying anything that they did in their struggle, and as absolving them of any responsibility for their actions.

This particular way of representing was based on a particular and somewhat idealized point of view, as exemplified by Kate Hudson: ‘Yugoslavia – the south Slav state – symbolized a progressive and open socialist society, held in high regard internationally for its monumental struggles for unity and independence and its role as the key leader of the Non-Aligned Movement’ (Hudson 2003: 1). As this heroic place ceased to exist, its disappearance provoked strong reactions and fervent attempts to place blame on those deemed responsible. Just like any other human beings, anthropologists tend to react emotionally, and then to proceed in their arguments from emotions, not necessarily from the ‘facts’.

Other Explanatory Models

Similar types of explanation were used in other parts of the former Yugoslavia, using different theoretical models. For example, some authors in Croatia claimed that anyone condemning the crimes of the Croatian army against Serbs in Croatia or Muslims in Bosnia were orientalising Croats (see Bošković 2005a). Using an essentialised explanation of the kind so roundly
criticised by Kuper (1994b, 2003), the argument was that no foreign or outside observer could possibly comprehend what was going on in Croatia, so their explanations were obviously biased and wrong. That is, ‘it takes one to know one’.10

This does not mean, however, that all representations of any parts of the former Yugoslavia endorse essentialist models of insider or authentic knowledge. For example, there is an excellent overview of recent Croatian ethnology and anthropology, with some important critical observations, by Prica (2005). In her paper, Prica, one of the most prominent Croatian ethnologists in recent years, took issue with some of the representations contained in her colleagues writings since 1991. Emphasising gendered scholarship in particular, since most contemporary Croatian ethnologists are female, Prica discussed the thematic and methodological problems of some recent ethnographies, including those dealing with war, suffering and refugees. She also criticised some Serbian interpretations of Croatian ethnology for their bias.

In general, however, the orientalisation of the peoples of the Balkans means that the concept of indigenism is transformed into an important political and epistemological category in this part of Europe. The natives are somehow supposed to have a privileged insight into how things are, and how they should be. This is very similar to what Plaice (this volume) refers to, when she mentions the Labrador Inuit Association and their insistence on the geographical and historical bases of belonging. In practice, the implication is that any criticism from the outside is unacceptable. Taken in this sense, indigenism in the Balkans provides a position of absolute intellectual and moral superiority, an assertion of immediate access to the truth.

The proponents of this concept – the great majority of ethnologists in Serbia – find their natural allies in some strange places. Besides approving of Todorova, they were also very pleased with Glenny’s book on the role of the Western powers in the Balkans (Glenny 1999). Its argument is not controversial in itself: the claim is that, given that foreign powers meddling in Balkan affairs were looking to promote their own interests, as great powers usually do, their intervention had disastrous consequences. Such an argument, however, suggests that if one blamed foreigners – the great colonial powers of Western Europe – for all the evils that happened in the region over the last two centuries, this not only absolves local populations and their political elites of any responsibility for their actions, but also paints a somewhat bleak picture of Balkan peoples as passive and unable to take the initiative, always waiting for something to be decided by others.

When it comes to representations of the Serbs, the ‘it takes one to know one’ argument has been used frequently. Several authors in the book Balkans as Metaphor (Bjelić and Savić 2002) argue along these lines. The claims made by one of them – Vesna Goldsworthy – are critically evaluated by Nankov (2002: 364–5), who shows how Goldsworthy would like to have it both ways. She is right when she objects to the deliberate simplifications of her people
(the Serbs), but then uses the very same stereotyping strategy when referring to ‘the West’. Even well-meaning outsiders can be complicit in this type of claim. An example can be found in the catalogue for the exhibition of Balkan artists in Graz in 2002 (Conover, Čufer and Weibel 2002). The curators of this exhibition, despite being outsiders themselves, used culture and cultural representations in order to promote stereotypes of Balkan peoples as distant and exotic. For example, exhibitions ‘typifying’ different places (of Romas for Romania; for Slovenia, a ‘Retro-avantgarde’ project by the Neue Slowenische Kunst (NSK); for Serbia, a video installation with a popular folk singer) were put on in separate pavilions, thus demonstrating their unique and exotic character. The curators further emphasise this in the catalogue, by offering ‘a short test’:

First, take the four or five criteria most widely used to define the Balkans. Many people would place on their list such things as: place of ethnic tensions, place where old traumas are replayed again and again, place which fears dangerous neighbours across the border, place where people like to complain endlessly, place which overvalues its ancestors.... Now, take that definition you have – whatever that is – and apply it to Austria, France, Italy, United States, whatever country you are from. Warning: the surest sign of Balkan identity is the resistance to Balkan identity. (ibid.: 5)

This use of stereotypes as ‘official’ representations creates an interesting situation in which any point of view dissonant from what ‘the natives’ say or think (or believe is politically appropriate), or put forward by an outsider, should be ignored, regardless of its actual merit(s) or arguments. A good example of this is way in which Serbian scholars have ignored the work of Dutch anthropologist Mattijs van der Port (1998). Van der Port did his fieldwork in the Vojvodina region in the north of Serbia, learning the language and doing detailed research into different aspects of Serbian social and cultural identity. However, as local ethnologists did not like the way he wrote, they simply chose to ignore him, without entering into any debate or argument, or trying to prove him wrong. This dislike was not based on anything factual, but simply on the fact that he was a foreigner and, as such, threatened to bridge the insider–outsider divide. This was a matter to which he referred with some irony, noting that ‘it takes a Serb to know a Serb’ (Van der Port 1999).

As in the case of Greece (Gefou-Madianou, this volume), ancient civilisations and artefacts have played a role in endorsing presentday ideas of culture. Some of the intellectual responses to the perceived ‘orientalisation’ or ‘balkanisation’ of the Serbs has to do with the insistence on the glorious aspects of ancient culture(s) in the region – such as the site of the first monumental sculpture in Europe (at Lepenski Vir, on the banks of the river Danube, a settlement which flourished c.6500 BCE), or the largest neolithic site in Europe (Vinča, on the outskirts of Belgrade, c.4000 BCE). Unfortunately, this celebration of ancient culture did not translate into increased state funding for
research in these important archaeological sites until the fall of the nationalist regime in Serbia, official authorities were primarily interested in ideology, not scholarship. On a symbolic plane, the insistence on the antiquity and importance of these sites was supposed to be the decisive argument that the Serbs are more ancient and more civilized than those - the others - who have no proper past or history, and hence no culture. More colourful and historically less accurate examples were drawn from the Middle Ages. There were stories of how medieval Serbian peasants had used knives and forks while Western European kings ate only with their hands, like true barbarians. Such stories, although unverified, nevertheless played their role in the popular Balkan imagination of the backwardness of others.

Popular representations of foreigners’ lack of culture, exemplified by the U.S. as well as by institutions like the EU or NATO, was also apparent inasmuch as the state-controlled media tended to report only on disasters and calamities happening in the outside world. The conclusion to be drawn was that only ‘we’ know how to live, how to entertain ourselves, how to stay out of trouble and, most of all, how to preserve and respect our cultural traditions.

This increasingly hardening set of stereotypes was not created in a vacuum, however. Conversely, a culture versus nature dichotomy, which fed upon and reinforced negative views of the Balkans by outsiders, was being gradually strengthened. For many so-called Western anthropologists brought up on the opinions of political analysts, and in line with what Todorova was criticizing, Balkan peoples appeared to be behaving irrationally, showing their proximity to nature. Culture, in contrast, was more complicated, more sophisticated, more distant, and reserved for more developed societies. The Balkan peoples were sufficiently ‘primitive’ to become objects of anthropological study by those from outside. Although anthropologists used history, demography and religion in their accounts of the Balkans (Hayden 2002), the primitive character of the inhabitants of the region – as natives on the margins of Europe – meant that ‘culture’ was not an obvious attribute.

**Some Evolutionist Theories Revisited**

It is not uncommon to find evolutionary explanations paraded in the public media, and to hear anthropologists dismissing these as simply wrong and out of date. We also tend to assume that such explanations cannot be used seriously today in any context. But is it really so? As recently as 1991, the expert legal and political commission led by Robert Badinter was appointed by the (then) European Community (EC) in order to determine which countries (former republics) of the former Yugoslavia conformed to the legal and political standards of the EC, in order for them to be officially recognized by it. Badinter’s Commission concluded that those countries were Slovenia and Macedonia. However, it was Slovenia and Croatia that the EC decided to
formally recognise. Unlike Macedonia, Croatia was assumed by European policy makers to have culture, and it was thus deemed worthy of full recognition by the elite group of EC countries. Macedonia, less economically developed and therefore more distant from the ‘enlightened West’, yet having fulfilled all the legal and political preconditions of official political recognition, was supposed to wait longer.13

Even among anthropologists who would normally repudiate hierarchical scales of value in favour of relativism, there is an implicit endorsement of evolutionist models. This can be seen in professional anthropologists’ lack of interest in developments outside their discipline’s mainstream (Anglo-American, French, German). Kuper’s attention to national anthropological traditions, and his co-founding role in the European Association of Social Anthropology (EASA), are distinct exceptions to the rule. While EASA has been much more open than many other professional associations to recognizing different or exotic voices, it is unclear whether many anthropologists working in Britain or the EU are aware of developments in their discipline in other countries, particularly those, like the Balkans, where the language of teaching and research is not English. This point has been raised in recent years by anthropologists like M uršič (2000) in Slovenia and H annerz in Sweden, speaking in his address at the D urham meeting of the A ssociation of Social Anthropologists in 2007. Despite the fact that in many such countries, publishing in English (and in foreign journals published in English) is considered a mark of distinction, and something that can significantly help one’s career (Bošković 2007),14 these anthropological traditions remain, for the most part, invisible.

The converse is also true. Whilst becoming increasingly involved in academic departments in the former Yugoslavia in recent years, I have been struck by their lack of interest in what is going on in the outside world. The virtual ignoring of Van der Port’s work is only a symptom of a much wider situation affecting the system of education in the former Yugoslavia. As political relations with Western countries become strained, education programmes tend to be more nationalist in orientation, and information regarding other parts of the world becomes increasingly unavailable. In Serbia, for example, obligatory foreign language courses were scrapped from the school curriculum after the nationalist government came into power in 2004.15 Perhaps this is some kind of ideological preparation for the isolation upon which some leading Serbian politicians thrive: they sense that they can realise their potential only in a small, closed, inward-looking and xenophobic society. ‘The West’ is perceived to be guilty of misrepresenting natives (‘us’), and as such is irrelevant. To ‘their’ lack of understanding of ‘us,’ we respond with a lack of interest in them. The end result further reinforces the ‘it takes one to know one’ attitude outlined above. This leads to the gradual diminution of the importance of the comparative perspective in teaching and research in anthropology, to which I recently objected (Bošković 2005b). This is in contrast to the growing public interest in anthropology, as
exemplified in the increasing numbers of students entering undergraduate studies in ethnology and cultural anthropology, in both Serbia and Croatia, as well as to the prominence of events such as the Ethnographic Film Festival in Belgrade.

Particular ways of inventing and recreating cultural notions are thus at play in this part of Europe, both from the side of ‘the natives’ and from that of the ‘outsiders’. Although the myth of the Balkans had already been constructed in a specific sense (and for particular political and ideological purposes) in the early twentieth century (Todorova 1994; Karakasidou 2002), the real primitive society invented in the 1990s was that of the ethnic communities of the former Yugoslavia, and in a struggle to explain the inexplicable, anthropologists found themselves in a paradoxical situation. On the one hand, they believed that they could somehow be objective and detached. On the other, the fierceness of convictions and conflicting accounts led to some heated debates which were anything but dispassionate (Hayden 2002, 2003, 2005; Denich 2005; Wilson 2005).

Kuper’s critique of the (mis)use of the concept of indigenism (Kuper 2003) is important here. His remarks point to some of the dangers of the newly established ‘it takes one to know one’ attitude. If taken seriously, absolutely privileging the insider’s point of view would obviously render all social – as well as many other – sciences impossible. However, the privileging of insiders is very tempting. It presents an easy way out, a perspective that would allow its protagonist simply to ignore what appears as irrelevant or, more likely, potentially dangerous to the national cause.

**Conclusion**

To conclude, if anthropological attempts to deal with post-conflict situations are to have any explanatory value, and if they are to approach a certain objective validity, they should be based on certain clear professional and ethical standards. Essentialisations of ‘good guys’ and ‘bad guys’ do not help at all. Neither does reaching into (imagined) history and carefully selecting those facts that serve one side in whatever struggle might be going on. Although this is not easy in situations that are extremely emotionally charged, I am encouraged by the example of social scientists working in Guatemala. Still recovering from a situation of extreme and violent conflict, a network of committed foreign scholars is working there with the aim of promoting local scholars and facilitating different forms of ‘local knowledge’. They are simultaneously involved in the social life of the communities where they do their research. An attempt is also made, and financial means secured, to translate articles and books into local Mayan languages, which makes outside interpretations readily available to local populations. At the same time, they are not suspending more internationally recognized criteria for measuring standards of ethnography.
Taking this as an example, it would be useful to attempt something similar in the countries of the former Yugoslavia. Doing so might enable both local and foreign anthropologists, and local and foreign media, to transcend the self-perpetuating and mutually reinforcing procedures through which the category of ‘the Balkans’ is endlessly reproduced.

Notes

1. Some of these explanations can be found in the volume edited by Halpern and Kideckel (2000).
2. A specialist in the anthropology of law, Professor in the Department of Anthropology of the University of Pittsburgh, and (at the time of the writing of this chapter) also head of the AAA’s section on Eastern Europe.
4. This does not imply that anthropologists should not take active part and serve as witnesses in legal cases, merely that the giving of ‘expert opinions’ can be motivated by partisan convictions.
5. For the examples of the First Nations in Canada and ‘indigenous people’ in South Africa, see Plaice and Barnard (this vol.) I am not interested here in discussing actual quality or (lack of) depth of these types of explanations, only in the fact that they were present (and quite influential) in the history of anthropology.
6. Klaus Roth, a German scholar, told me in a personal communication (2007) that German descriptions of ‘the Balkans’ from the same period, which lack these essentialisations, are absent from Todorova’s account.
7. Todorova did not explain why there were no different, ‘native,’ or ‘insider’ attempts to explain the Balkans. For an extremely interesting and ethnographically based account of the topic, see Živković (2001).
8. In television reports from the ‘Balkan wars’ in the U.S. in the early 1990s, stereotyped depictions of Serbs sometimes resembled cartoon characters.
9. For examples of some Croatian controversies dealing with geographical (dis)locations, see Rihtman-Augustin (1999).
10. Although I admire Bringa’s (1995) ethnography of the war in Bosnia, I am also aware of the potent criticism of her position by a leading Croatian ‘ethno-anthropologist,’ the late Dunja Rihtman-Augustin (2004: 122–4). On potential problems with anthropologists as ‘expert witnesses,’ see also note 4.
11. Only Vincă remains today. The site of Lepenski Vir has been relocated, its fabulous triangular dwellings moved to higher ground during 1960s to make space for the Iron Gates hydroelectric dam on the river Danube (Srejović 1981; Tasić et al. 1990).
12. Few anthropologists explored the consequences of these explanations or their implications for ‘locals’ (but see Van der Port 1999; Bringa 2005).
13. Following this there were disputes over the country’s constitutional name which demonstrated more about the EU’s incapacity to deal with problems in an efficient and rational way than about the ‘Macedonian question’ (Bošković 2006: 81–83).
14. Among notable exceptions are Brazil and Japan, countries with large anthropological communities (professional associations in each country have around 2,000 members) and distinctive research traditions.
15. In 2005, the former Minister of Education, Ljiljana Ćolić, also proposed abolishing the teaching of classical evolutionary theory. Fortunately, her proposal did not pass, and she was eventually forced to resign.
16. See, for example, Fischer and McKenna Brown (1996) and Fischer and Benson (2006).